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Recently the media have focused on the threat that insurgents in 
failed states with weapons of mass destruction pose to wealthy nations 
of the West—the United States, Canada, and the countries of Europe. 
Scholars predict that a clash between the West and Islam is inevitable. 
Amid this peril, we should not forget that war, state violence, and rebel 
resistance threaten the livelihood and the very lives of millions of the 
poor in Africa and Asia. About 20 percent of Africans live in countries 
seriously disrupted by war or state violence. The cost of conflict in-
cludes refugee flows, increased military spending, damage to transport 
and communication, reduction in trade and investment, and diversion 
of resources from development. The World Bank (2000, pp. 57–59) es-
timates that civil war in an African country lowers the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita by 2.2 percent annually. Scholars must focus 
on reducing this danger to the survival income and human rights of the 
world’s poorest.
Economic stagnation, political decay, and deadly political vio-
lence interact mutually: economic and political factors contribute to 
war, while war has an adverse effect on economic growth and politi-
cal development. This paper analyzes how economic decline, income 
inequality, a weakening state, pervasive rent seeking by ruling elites, 
an extensive threat to survival income, and competition for control of 
mineral exports contribute to humanitarian emergencies. These emer-
gencies compose a human-made crisis in which large numbers of peo-
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ple die and suffer from war, state violence, and refugee displacement, 
and they are usually accompanied by widespread disease and hunger 
(Väyrynen 2000a). 
 What are the sources of humanitarian emergencies? Auvinen and 
Nafziger (1999) show that stagnation and decline in real (inflation-ad-
justed) GDP, slow growth in average food production, high income in-
equality, a high ratio of military expenditure to national income, and 
a tradition of violent conflict are sources of emergencies. The study 
also finds that countries that failed to adjust to chronic external deficits 
were more vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. In addition, politi-
cal variables, such as predatory rule, authoritarianism, and state decay 
and collapse,1 interact with economic variables to affect vulnerability 
to humanitarian emergencies. The findings are by and large consistent 
for three measures of the dependent variable and for many different 
regression models.2
However, the focus of this chapter is much less on econometrics 
than on a discussion of how factors embedded in the political economy 
of developing countries contribute to humanitarian emergencies. “Po-
litical economy” includes not only economic analysis but also an ex-
amination of the interests of political leaders and policymakers who 
make economic decisions and of members of the population who are 
affected by these decisions. This politico-economic analysis is based 
on a research project begun in 1996 by the United Nations University’s 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Hel-
sinki, and Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford (QEH). It generalizes on 
the case studies of 17 war-affected less-developed countries (LDCs) 
and explains the reasons for econometric findings from the annual data 
of 124 LDCs from 1980 to 1995 (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999).3 The 
case studies include Nigeria and Pakistan from the late 1960s and early 
1970s and Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Haiti, El Salvador, Colombia, 
Bosnia, and the South Caucasus from 1980 to 2000.
STAGNATION AND DECLINE IN INCOMES
Contemporary emergencies are found in low- and middle-income 
(that is, developing) countries, suggesting a ceiling above which war 
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and massive state violence do not occur. A disproportional number of 
these states are also weak or failing (Holsti 2000, pp. 243–250), a trait 
that interacts as both cause and effect of their relative poverty. More-
over, emergencies are more likely to occur in countries experiencing 
stagnation in real GDP per capita and a breakdown in law and pub-
lic services. These phenomena affect relative deprivation, the actors’ 
perception of social injustice from a discrepancy between goods and 
conditions they expect and those they can get or keep. This deprivation 
often results from vertical (class) or horizontal (regional or communal) 
inequality (Stewart 2000, p. 16), where the actors’ income or conditions 
are related to those of others within society. Relative deprivation spurs 
social discontent, which provides motivation for collective violence 
(Gurr 1970). Among the components of emergencies, war and violence 
have major catalytic roles, adding to social disruption and political in-
stability, undermining economic activity, spreading hunger and disease, 
and fueling refugee flows. A marked deterioration of living conditions, 
especially during a period of high expectations, is likely to produce so-
cio-political discontent that may be mobilized into political violence.
During the twentieth century, some 200 million people were killed 
in war or state violence (Rummel 1994), but only a small proportion of 
these deaths came from insurgent action or fighting between belliger-
ents. Holsti (2000, pp. 250–267) demonstrates that the policies of gov-
erning elites are at the root of most humanitarian emergencies,4 a fact 
not recognized in most research on war (cf. Collier 2000a; Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). Slow or negative per-capita growth puts pressure on 
ruling coalitions. Ruling elites can expand rent-seeking opportunities 
for existing political elites, contributing to further economic stagnation 
that can threaten the legitimacy of the regime and increase the probabil-
ity of regime turnover. To forestall threats to the regime, political elites 
may use repression to suppress discontent or capture a greater share of 
the majority’s shrinking surplus. These repressive policies may entail 
acts of direct violence against or withholding food and other supplies 
from politically disobedient groups, as in Sudan in the 1980s (Keen 
2000, pp. 292–294). Moreover, repression and economic discrimination 
may generate relative deprivation and trigger socio-political mobiliza-
tion on the part of the groups affected, leading to further violence and 
thus worsening the humanitarian crisis.
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Since economic deceleration or collapse can disrupt ruling coali-
tions and exacerbate mass discontent, we should not be surprised that 
since 1980 the globe, particularly Africa, has been more vulnerable to 
humanitarian emergencies. This increase in intrastate political conflict 
and humanitarian emergencies in Africa in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century is linked to the continent’s negative per-capita growth 
in the 1970s and 1980s and virtual stagnation in the 1990s. Indeed, in 
Africa, which had the highest death rate from wars in the 1990s of any 
continent, GDP per capita was lower in the late 1990s than it was at the 
end of the 1960s (World Bank 2000, p. 1).5
This stagnation and decline was often associated with, and exac-
erbated by, a predatory state, driven by ethnic and regional competi-
tion for the bounties of the state. Predatory rule involves a personalistic 
regime ruling through coercion, material inducement, and personality 
politics, tending to degrade the institutional foundations of the econo-
my and state. Elites extract immediate rents and transfers rather than 
providing incentives for economic growth. In some predatory states, the 
ruling elite and their clients “use their positions and access to resources 
to plunder the national economy through graft, corruption, and extor-
tion, and to participate in private business activities” (Holsti 2000, p. 
251). Ake (1996, p. 42) contends that “instead of being a public force, 
the state in Africa tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the ser-
vice of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite.” People use 
funds at the disposal of the state for systematic corruption, from petty 
survival venality at the lower echelons of government to kleptocracy at 
the top.
Humanitarian crises are more likely to occur in societies where 
the state is weak and venal, and thus subject to extensive rent-seek-
ing, “an omnipresent policy to obtain private benefit from public action 
and resources” (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 440). Cause and effect between 
state failure and rent seeking are not always clear. State failure does not 
necessarily result from the incapacity of public institutions but from 
the interests of rulers. While “state failure can harm a great number 
of people, it can also benefit others,” especially governing elites and 
their allies (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 442). These elites may not benefit from 
avoiding political decay through nurturing free entry and the rule of 
law and reducing corruption and exploitation. Instead political leaders 
may gain more from extensive unproductive, profit-seeking activities 
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in a political system they control than from long-term efforts to build 
a well-functioning state in which economic progress and democratic 
institutions flourish. These activities tend to be pervasive in countries 
that have abundant mineral exports (for example, diamonds and pe-
troleum), such as Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, and Liberia, 
while predatory economic behavior has a lower payoff in mineral-poor 
economies such as Tanzania and Togo.
The majority of countries with humanitarian emergencies have 
experienced several years (or even decades) of negative or stagnant 
growth, where growth refers to real growth in GNP or GDP per capita. 
Widespread negative growth among populations where a majority is 
close to levels of subsistence increases the vulnerability to humanitar-
ian disasters. From 1980 to 1991, 40 of 58 Afro-Asian countries, or 69 
percent, experienced negative growth, according to the World Bank’s 
World Development Report (1993, pp. 238–239). In contrast, from 
1960 to 1980, only 9 of 53 had negative economic growth, according 
to the earlier World Bank annual (1982, pp. 110–111). In addition, the 
positive growth of Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1960s 
and 1970s also reversed to negative growth in the 1980s, according to 
the same World Bank sources. The interrelationship between growth 
and emergencies suggests that the increased emergencies in the early 
1990s are connected to the developing world’s disastrous growth record 
of the 1980s. This disastrous growth was accompanied by state decay, 
as ruling elites, facing limitations in dispersing benefits to a wide-rang-
ing coalition of ethnic communities and economic groups, struggled 
for control, allied with other strongmen, and strengthened their military 
capability to repress potential rebels and dissidents. 
Econometric and country evidence indicates that, holding other 
variables constant, slow real GDP growth helps explain humanitarian 
emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies also contribute to reduced (of-
ten negative) growth (Stewart, Huang, and Wang 2001, pp. 11–41), al-
though according to econometric tests by Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) 
the direction of causation is weaker than from growth to emergencies. 
Contemporary humanitarian disaster is rarely episodic; rather, it is usu-
ally a culmination of longer-term politico-economic decay over a decade 
or more. Negative per-capita growth interacts with political predation 
in a downward spiral, a spiral seen in African countries such as Angola, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire (Congo). 
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Economic stagnation, frequently accompanied by chronic trade 
deficits and growing external debt, intensifies the need for economic 
adjustment and stabilization. A persistent external disequilibrium has 
costs whether countries adjust or not. But nonadjustment has the greater 
cost; the longer the disequilibrium, the greater is the social damage and 
the more painful the adjustment.6 Most LDCs face frequent internation-
al balance-of-payments problems, which reduce the ability of political 
leaders to maintain control. But abundant exports, such as minerals, 
together with a strong military, can provide the ruler or warlord with a 
modicum of security. 
More than a decade of slow growth, rising borrowing costs, reduced 
concessional aid, a mounting debt crisis, and the increased economic 
liberalism of donors and international financial institutions, compelled 
LDC (especially African) elites to change their strategies during the 
1980s and 1990s. Widespread economic liberalization and adjustment 
provided chances for challenging existing elites, threatening their posi-
tions, and contributing to increased opportunistic rent-seeking and overt 
repression. Cuts in spending reduced the funds available to distribute to 
clients and required greater military and police support for rulers to 
remain in power. 
INCOME INEQUALITY
Large income inequality exacerbates the vulnerability of popula-
tions to humanitarian emergencies. Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) cross-
section study of 71 developing countries, 1960–1985, finds that income 
inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political insta-
bility, as measured by deaths in intrastate disturbances and assassina-
tions (per million population) and coups (both successful and unsuc-
cessful). Moreover, the policies of predatory and authoritarian rulers 
increase income inequality.
To measure income inequality, Nafziger and Auvinen (2003, p. 
90) used Gini coefficients calculated from an expanded and qualita-
tively improved dataset from Deininger and Squire (1996, pp. 56–91), 
although we decided not to use data from studies they relied on that 
were based on incomparable research methodologies. We were able to 
find relationships between Gini and war, which World Bank researchers 
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Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and others, without this dataset, could not 
find. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 563) indicate “there is insufficient 
data to introduce distributional considerations into the empirical analy-
sis.” Our regressions indicate that high Gini or income concentration 
contributes to humanitarian emergencies.
Indeed, because of inadequate income inequality data, Collier 
(2000b, pp. 10–11, 13) concludes that “inequality does not seem to ef-
fect the risk of conflict. Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the 
poor . . . Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to 
create them . . . However, it is the military needs of the rebel organiza-
tion which have created this political conflict rather than the objective 
grievances.”7 
WIDER researchers (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen 2000, both 
volumes), who include deaths from state violence as a part of humani-
tarian emergencies, examine deadly political violence more broadly 
than merely by focusing on rebellions, and they hold a contrasting view 
to that of Collier. Indeed, the WIDER approach is consistent with the 
finding that objective grievances of poverty and inequality contribute to 
war and humanitarian emergencies.
Severe social tensions leading to humanitarian emergencies may 
even arise under conditions of positive (even rapid) growth and ex-
panding resource availability. High inequality can contribute to the im-
miseration or absolute deprivation of portions of the population, even 
with growth. Absolute deprivation during substantial growth was ex-
perienced, for instance, by Igbo political elites, dominant in Nigeria’s 
Eastern Region, in the early 1960s. The East lost oil tax revenues from a 
change in allocation by the federal government, which ceased distribut-
ing mineral export revenues to regional governments. 
Moreover, through the demonstration effect of consumption levels 
of the relatively well off, high income concentration increases the per-
ception of relative deprivation among substantial sections of the popu-
lation, even when they do not experience absolute deprivation. The risk 
of political disintegration increases with a surge of income disparities 
by class, region, and community, especially when these disparities lack 
legitimacy among the population. Class and communal (regional, eth-
nic, and religious) economic differences often overlap, exacerbating 
perceived grievances and the potential for strife.
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This type of wide income inequality results from historical legacies 
of discrimination (colonialism, apartheid, failed policies), from govern-
ment policies in distributing land and other assets, taxation, and the 
benefits of public expenditure, from regional and ethnic economic com-
petition, and from predatory rule. Growing regional inequality and lim-
ited regional economic integration, associated with economic enclaves, 
can exacerbate ethnic and regional competition and conflict.
Regional factors contributing to conflict include educational and 
employment differences, revenue allocation, and language discrimina-
tion, which disadvantages minority language communities. There are 
many examples: 
• The struggle for petroleum tax revenues and employment in 
the civil service and modern sector in Nigeria in the early to 
mid-1960s
• The distribution of resources from East to West and employment 
discrimination against Bengalis in Pakistan in the 1950s and 
1960s 
• The conflict between Hutu and Tutsi for control of the state and 
access to employment in Burundi and Rwanda 
• The contention over the distribution of falling economic resourc-
es and rising debt obligations in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 
early 1990s 
• State discrimination against Tamils in language, employment, 
and education in postindependent Sri Lanka
While high inequality is associated with emergencies, insurgency is 
more likely if the less advantaged can identify the perpetuators of their 
poverty and suffering. The examples of Nigeria in the 1960s, South 
Africa from the early 1970s through the early 1990s, and Chiapas, Mex-
ico, in the 1990s (Nafziger and Auvinen 2000, pp. 105–108) illustrate 
the diverse patterns of how discriminatory government policies cause 
economic inequality, fuel social discontent, and lead to political con-
flict and humanitarian emergencies. These dynamics may even occur 
either when the nation’s real per-capita GDP is growing, as in Nigeria 
in the 1960s, or when the disadvantaged group’s economic position is 
improving, as for nonwhite South Africans from the 1960s through the 
early 1980s.
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High income inequality can be a source of humanitarian emergen-
cies in both rapidly and slowly growing countries. But, once a popula-
tion is dissatisfied with income discrepancies and social discrimination, 
as the majority nonwhites were in white-ruled South Africa, the rising 
expectations associated with incremental reductions in poverty and in-
equality may actually spur the revolt, conflict, and hostile action from 
the state that increase the probability of a humanitarian emergency (Da-
vies 1962, pp. 5–19).8 
COMPETITION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
Collier contends (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, pp. 568–569; Collier 
2000a, pp. 92–95) that the possession of primary commodities, espe-
cially exports, increases the occurrence and duration of civil war. Mwa-
nasali (2000, p. 145) indicates the reasons why. “Primary commodity 
exports present several advantages to the belligerents. Because they 
are generic products, rather than brand names, their origin can easily 
be concealed. They are usually the most heavily taxable, especially in 
kind, and their production or marketing does not require the compli-
cated processes, as is the case of manufactured goods.”
Primary goods include both agricultural (usually renewable) and 
mineral (largely non-renewable) commodities. According to de Soysa’s 
statistical tests (2000, pp. 123–24), “the incidence of civil war is com-
pletely unrelated to the per capita availability of natural resources, de-
fined as the stocks of both renewable resources . . . and nonrenewables.” 
But, once de Soysa refines her independent variable to include only 
mineral resources, her result is highly significant. She finds that “the 
higher the per capita availability of . . . mineral wealth, the greater the 
incidence of conflict” (ibid., p. 124). The following, based mainly on 
work by WIDER researchers (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen 2000, 
both volumes), explains why minerals contribute to conflict and state 
violence.
In the struggle for allies during the Cold War, the United States 
and the Soviet Union provided military and economic aid for develop-
ing countries. Sovereignty provided the opportunity for newly formed 
African states to extract resources from the major powers in exchange 
for diplomatic support. Yet aid could provide the basis for supporting a 
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patronage system for either the state or for insurgents. When the Cold 
War ended in the early 1990s, nation-states and rebels in the develop-
ing world required different strategies and new sources of funds. Many 
countries in Africa and Asia needed control of resources to provide 
military and police power but needed to provide only minimal services 
to control territory. Indeed, with the emphasis from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on the market and private 
enterprise, predatory rulers often undermined their own bureaucracies 
to build personal power at the expense of their citizens’ health, educa-
tion, and agricultural development (Reno 2000, pp. 231–232; Väyrynen 
2000b, pp. 437–479).
The struggle for control over minerals and other natural resources 
is an important source of conflict. In Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Congo-Kinshasa, rulers and warlords used exclusive contracts with 
foreign firms for diamonds and other minerals to “regularize” sources 
of revenue in lieu of a government agency to collect taxes (Reno 1996, 
1998, 2000). In comparison, Tanzania and Togo lacked the tradable 
resources to become a predatory society (Väyrynen 2000b, pp. 444–
445).
After the decline of aid following the Cold War, Sierra Leone be-
came more susceptible to pressures for liberalization and adjustment 
from the IMF and World Bank. In 1991, the IMF, the bank, and bilateral 
creditors (national governments) offered loans and debt rescheduling 
worth $625 million—about 80 percent of GNP—if Sierra Leone re-
duced government expenditure and employment. Freetown heeded the 
World Bank’s advice (1994, pp. 22–51) to use private operators to run 
state services for a profit. But privatization did not eliminate the pres-
sures of clients demanding payoffs; it merely shifted the arena of client-
age to the private sector. Sierra Leone’s ruling elites, needing new ways 
of exercising power, used foreign firms to consolidate power and stave 
off threats from political rivals. In the 1990s, Sierra Leonean heads of 
state relied on exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamond min-
ing to stabilize revenue, on foreign mercenaries and advisors to replace 
the national army in providing security, and on foreign contractors 
(sometimes the same mining or security firms) to provide other state 
services. In the process, rulers have found it advantageous to “destroy 
state agencies, to ‘cleanse’ them of politically threatening patrimonial 
Economic Development, Inequality, and War   41
hangers-on and use violence to extract resources from people under 
their control” (Reno 1996, pp. 7–8, 12). 
In Liberia, Charles Taylor used external commercial networks (for-
eign firms), some a legacy of the Samuel Doe regime of the late 1980s, 
to amass power, at times extending his control to the eastern periphery 
of Sierra Leone. Taylor’s territory had its own currency and banking sys-
tem, telecommunications network, airfields, export trade (in diamonds, 
timber, gold, and farm products), and (until 1993) a deepwater port. All 
went to support arms imports. For Taylor, a warlord during most of the 
1990s before being elected Liberia’s president in 1997, controlling ter-
ritory by building a patronage network was easier than building a state 
and its bureaucracy (Reno 1995, p. 111). Indeed, from 1990 to 1996, 
Taylor had access to annual revenues exceeding $100 million, with an 
upper limit around $200 million (Reno 2000, pp. 243, 252).
Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–1997), like other hard-
pressed rulers in weak African states, mimicked the approach of war-
lords. But with the shrinking patronage base from foreign aid and invest-
ment, to prevent a coup by newly marginalized groups in the army or 
bureaucracy, Mobutu, as did rulers in other retrenching African states, 
needed to reconfigure his political authority. In this situation, foreign 
firms and contractors served as a new source of patronage networks. 
Indigenous commercial interests that profit from the new rules are not 
independent capitalists with interests distinct from the state’s, but rather 
clients of predatory rulers. As Reno (1996, p. 16) points out, “Those 
who do not take part in accumulation on the ruler’s terms are punished.” 
Mobutu weathered the collapse of the state bureaucracy but fell be-
cause his strategy of milking state assets had reached a limit, seriously 
weakening the patronage system. In 1997, his forces fell to the Alliance 
des Forces Democratique pour la Liberation (AFDI) of Laurent Kabila, 
who became president of the Democratic Republic of Congo but was 
assassinated in 2001 (Reno 1996, pp. 9–16; Reno 1998, pp. 147–81).
State failure, as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zaire, increases vul-
nerability to war and humanitarian emergencies. Yet in a weak or failed 
state some rulers, warlords, and traders are more likely to profit from 
war and violence than from peacetime. Indeed, as Väyrynen (2000b, 
p. 442) argues, war, political violence, and state failure do not result 
from the incapacity of public institutions but from the fact that rulers, 
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warlords, and their clients benefit from the harm thereby befalling a 
substantial share of the population. 
Relative deprivation also helps explain the increased violence by 
belligerents and their clients. An abrupt rush of mineral wealth raises 
not only the expectations of prosperity by the allies of rulers and war-
lords that control the resource but also the lure of combat to potential 
rebels that want to control the resource. Indeed, as Gurr (1970, pp. 73, 
79) indicates, the intensity of deprivation felt increases with the dis-
crepancy between potential and actual conditions, and with the length 
of time the deprivation persists. In Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, and Sierra 
Leone, the length and intensity of perceived deprivation were consider-
able.
DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM
Legitimacy is not only materially defined. Political deprivation aris-
es from a lack of meaningful participation in making political decisions, 
whether this participation is prevented by law or through repression. In 
effect, a constant and frequent use of repression indicates lack of legiti-
macy and political capacity (Jackman 1993). Efficient repression may 
prolong authoritarian rule, as demonstrated for example by Augusto 
Pinochet’s Chile and Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi, but eventu-
ally the people are likely to challenge the regime from a “desperate 
bargainer” position. Democratic regimes do not guarantee the absence 
of conflict, but since they are likely to be more widely accepted, ex-
pressions of discontent are not aimed at challenging their basic tenets. 
Large-scale conflict and humanitarian emergencies are virtually nonex-
istent in democratic societies.
Authoritarianism and the Extent of Conflict
What are the empirical findings on the relationship between extent 
of political conflict and authoritarianism? On the one hand, openness in 
a political system encourages political actions of all kinds, and not all 
of them are likely to be voiced through formal institutions. Graham and 
Gurr show that democracies typically have more extensive “civil con-
flict” than autocracies. Gurr and Eckstein see chronic low-level conflict 
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as “a price democracies have to pay for freedom from regimentation, 
from the state or from authorities in other social units” (Eckstein 1980, 
p. 452). 
Democratic political regimes do not repress their citizens or inflict 
severe sanctions on protestors. Authoritarian regimes are prone to re-
press unrest (see Hibbs 1973), and the citizens are more likely to refrain 
from rebellious action when these regimes are in power. Turkey (1980–
1984) and Morocco (after 1984), for instance, imposed “long term and 
systematic repression—serious restrictions on civil and human rights, 
persistent arrests of suspected ‘activists,’ use of heavy prison sentenc-
ing and torture, banning of political movements and opposition trade 
unions—on protestors” and were spared serious unrest until the end of 
the 1980s (Seddon 1992, p. 49). The threshold of rebellious political 
action is higher, and therefore authoritarian regimes are likely to experi-
ence less political protest than democracies.
Nevertheless, authoritarian political structures are conducive to con-
flict because repression increases opposition group activity. By adopting 
coercive politics against dissidents, the regime loses legitimacy, and its 
actions thereby become the catalyst for the mobilization of previously 
neutral actors (Davis and Ward 1990, pp. 451–452). Repression may 
also harden the determination of members of the opposition and ignite 
a tougher response from rebellious groups. As a consequence, relatively 
innocent incidents of protest may escalate into large-scale rebellions 
with a large number of casualties.
Most research (see Auvinen 1996, p. 79) has detected an inverted 
U-curve relationship between type of regime and political conflict: mild 
repression incites conflict, and only intense repression deters it.9 The 
rationale behind the inverted U-curve is that, on one end of the curve, 
the severe costs of rebellion in an extremely repressive political system 
inhibit resource mobilization by dissident groups; on the other end, the 
availability of reasonably effective peaceful means of political action in 
a nonrepressive political system makes rebellion an undesirable strat-
egy of opposition for most people; but in the middle, rebellion is likely 
to be the preferred strategy of opposition for many dissident groups in a 
semirepressive political system in which resource mobilization is pos-
sible and peaceful opposition typically is ineffective (Muller and Weede 
1990, p. 627).
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A distinction is sometimes made between structural or institutional-
ized repression and behavioral repression. Structural repression refers 
to the repressive capability of the regime, while behavioral repression 
refers to actual acts of coercion by the government or parts thereof. The 
two are not necessarily the same because even the most democratic re-
gimes do not guarantee the absence of repression. This is demonstrated 
by the occasional use of repression by Western democracies (Henderson 
1973, p. 133). Nevertheless, Muller and Weede (1990) found that the 
inverted U-curve applies to both structural and behavioral repression.
Muller and Weede suggest that an inverted U-curve relationship 
supports a theory of belligerents as rational actors. An actor who cal-
culates utilities and, particularly, costs of action, takes into account the 
probability that when the level of repression is high, the expected ben-
efits of either rebellion or peaceful collective action will be relatively 
low because of high costs and a low expectancy of success. When re-
pression is low, the expected benefits of rebellion will be exceeded by 
the expected benefits of peaceful collective action. When repression is 
moderate, the expected benefits of rebellion will exceed those of peace-
ful collective action (Muller and Weede 1990, p. 628). This explanation 
of conflict as a function of rational actors calculating costs and benefits 
provides some support to Collier’s greed theory, even if only political 
and not economic benefits are evident. However, Muller and Weede 
admit that you may arrive at the same proposition from a relative de-
privation perspective (1990, p. 647), which corresponds to grievance 
theory.10 
Authoritarianism and the Form of Conflict
Authoritarian regimes are more susceptible to rebellion than to po-
litical protest. In Gurr and Lichbach’s study (1986, p. 69), autocratic 
governments faced proportionally three times as much revolutionary 
opposition as democratic governments, but were less likely to hear re-
formist demands. In Chile, the coup d’état of 1973 interrupted a long 
tradition of democratic rule. Legitimate opposition was disallowed and 
repressed, which led to the development of new and radical forms of 
political resistance.
The prevailing norms of political regimes, whether democratic or 
authoritarian, influence the tactics of dissidents and the responses of the 
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elites to them. Democratic elites are disposed to make appreciable con-
cessions to protest, whereas authoritarian regimes, be they of the left or 
the right, are more likely to rely on repression. In democratic countries, 
this reinforces the utility of protest over rebellion, whereas in autocra-
cies it increases the relative usefulness of rebellion for challengers who 
are desperate enough to act at all (Gurr and Lichbach 1986, p. 12).
Democracies may not discourage political protest, but they are suc-
cessful in eliminating or strongly reducing the probability of rebellion. 
Gurr and Lichbach found that in democratic countries, dissidents rarely 
had revolutionary objectives; reformist demands were 10 times as com-
mon (1986, p. 69). Civil conflicts are also less deadly in democracies 
than in autocracies (Graham and Gurr 1969). Hibbs (1973) shows this by 
employing Cutright’s (1963) index of political development, although 
the relationship disappears if economic development is controlled for.11 
Hazlewood divides political systems into polyarchic, centrist, and per-
sonalist. He finds that in polyarchic systems the number of revolutions, 
guerrilla wars, and assassinations was smaller but the number of gov-
ernmental crises and riots was larger, compared to the sample mean. 
Personalist states were above the mean for all states on these five con-
flict indicators and above the mean for each of the other groups on all 
indicators except riots. Centrist systems had the lowest mean values on 
all indicators except revolutions (Hazelwood 1973, p. 184).12
Authoritarianism and Irregular Executive Transfer
The chances of peaceful regime change are limited under authori-
tarian rule. In the 1980s, before the end of the Cold War, political lib-
eralization was infrequent. The most common mechanism for changing 
an authoritarian regime was by force, sometimes through mass rebel-
lion or revolution but more commonly through a coup d’état by the 
elite. Authoritarianism was the most important determinant of political 
instability in Central America, save in Costa Rica, where peaceful and 
routine procedures for the transfer of power were established. In such 
coups, Lindenberg says, “The seeds of discontent for the next crisis 
cycle have been planted during the period of stable military rule with-
out concurrent mechanisms for channeling this discontent into peaceful 
regime change” (1990, pp. 416, 419). In autocratic regimes, coups are 
invariably the preferred mode of succession. More than 80 percent of 
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the countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced at least one successful 
or unsuccessful coup from the 1950s to the early 1980s (Johnson, Slat-
er, and McGowan 1984). In most cases, authoritarian regimes followed 
one another. More than two-thirds of the executive transfers between 
1965 and 1987 were “irregular” (Hughes and May 1988). Adelman and 
Hihn conclude that “the possibility of political instability, or that of dis-
continuous political transitions, can be greatly reduced if governments 
make a conscious effort to pursue a development process that leads to 
greater social mobility and is combined with increased political partici-
pation” (Adelman and Hihn 1984, p. 20).
In closed political systems, elites are the main contestants for political 
power and enrichment. The main elite groups may unite to support the 
government if economic growth is sufficient to accrue benefits to all of 
them. On the other hand, economic hardship is likely to affect distribu-
tion and form cleavages within the elite, so that the threat of a coup d’état 
by relatively deprived groups increases. Democratic regimes imply more 
open decision-making. Political participation and competition should re-
duce the exclusiveness of opportunity for enrichment in political office. 
The elite is more likely to be divided into different pluralist power cen-
ters that compete for political power within democratically functioning 
institutions (Morrison and Stevenson 1971, p. 349). Of course, elites may 
use democracy’s liberties for personal enrichment and corruption. Nev-
ertheless, democratic regimes are likely to discourage coups, even while 
encouraging political protest as a favored mode of dissent. 
Although democratic political regimes may be less susceptible than 
authoritarian regimes to elite instability in general and to irregular execu-
tive transfer in particular, they too have been overthrown during periods 
of economic hardship. On the basis of Latin American developments in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the bureaucratic-authoritarian approach postulated 
a causal link between economic crises and political authoritarianism in 
countries at middle levels of economic development (O’Donnell 1973, 
1978): the military took political power when it perceived that democratic 
regimes were incapable of coping with the social consequences brought 
about by economic decline. This argument lost much credibility in the 
1980s when democratic regimes replaced authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America (see Frieden 1989, p. 123). O’Donnell explained this new devel-
opment by those countries’ citizens attaching an increased intrinsic value 
to democracy. The populace brought about this value change in two ways: 
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first, by discrediting groups that sought a violent and immediate route 
to socialism, and second, by reflecting on experiences with authoritarian 
regimes that, despite using unprecedented repression and violence, failed 
to bring about economic progress (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 
1986, pp. 15–17). Democracy became a preferable alternative to authori-
tarian rule.
In fact, Latin American democracies were more durable than autocra-
cies during the debt crises of both the 1930s and the 1980s. No democratic 
government was brought down in the 1980s as a result of continued debt 
outflow (Drake 1989, pp. 53–54). In Asia, the countries of Pakistan, South 
Korea, and the Philippines all moved toward more democratic rule. In 
some African countries the trend was slightly different. Ghana (1981), Ni-
geria (1983), and Sudan (1989) experienced a shift from fairly democratic 
to authoritarian regimes as a result of coups d’état. Notably, in Ghana a 
democratic paralysis had brought the economy to the brink of collapse 
before the coup. Overall, however, the recent empirical evidence runs 
contrary to the bureaucratic-authoritarian argument.
Authoritarian regimes have been able to cling to power during pe-
riods of relative prosperity, but they are more prone to collapse during 
economic crises than democracies. All of the breakdowns of authoritar-
ian regimes discussed in the collection by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead (1986) were accompanied by economic crises (Bermeo 
1990, p. 372). Dictatorships have a narrow base of legitimacy and sup-
port, which makes them dependent on being able to keep an efficient 
economy and an orderly society (Drake 1989, pp. 53–54). But democ-
racies gain legitimacy from electoral, not merely effectual, means.13 
Compared to democracies, authoritarian regimes are also more depen-
dent on foreign lenders to stay in power. Neither Turkey nor Morocco 
experienced social unrest in the context of macroeconomic stabilization 
and structural adjustment policies; both were generously supported by 
IMF, the World Bank, and other lenders. This “made possible a degree 
of ‘cushioning’ in the economy which would otherwise have been im-
possible” (Seddon 1992, p. 49).14
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OTHER FACTORS
Military centrality, as indicated by the ratio of military expendi-
ture to GNP, contributes to humanitarian emergencies through several 
dynamics. On the one hand, military resources may be used to support 
predatory and authoritarian rulers, who generate desperate action and 
military response by the opposition. Under political deprivation and in 
the absence of political mechanisms to settle grievances, full-scale re-
bellion becomes more likely. Alternatively, a strong military may over-
throw either a democratic or an authoritarian regime, which may lead 
to political instability and humanitarian crisis. Powerful armed forces 
constitute a constant threat to civilian regimes in less-developed coun-
tries. Particularly during economic austerity, the regimes are afraid to 
cut back on military spending; they may even strengthen the military 
to stave off threats from the opposition. This, in turn, entails heavy so-
cioeconomic costs for the population, inducing further discontent and 
increasing the risk of rebellion. In very poor countries, an increasing 
budget allocation for the military may produce downright starvation 
and destitution.
Citizens adapt to a certain acceptable level of violence through the 
cultural experience of violence. A tradition of intensive political vio-
lence makes societies more susceptible to war and humanitarian emer-
gencies.15 Countries with a history of mass political mobilization for 
conflict, such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Colombia, are likely to be more 
susceptible to conflict in humanitarian emergencies than other, histori-
cally more peaceful countries. A tradition of conflict is an indicator of 
the legitimacy of political violence. 
In empirical studies, including conflict tradition in the model helps 
improve model specification. Auvinen (1997, p. 187) found that levels 
of previous political protests, rebellions, and irregular transfers were 
related to present levels. 
ETHNICITY
Ethnic identity is not a primordial given. Ethnicity, when implicated 
in humanitarian emergencies, is created, manifested, combined, and re-
constituted in struggles to share benefits from modernization and self-
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government but is not a source of these struggles (Nafziger, Stewart, and 
Väyrynen 2000, both volumes). As Widner says (1999, p. 406), “Ethnic 
identities are socially constructed, highly malleable, and situationally 
defined.” For example, the concept of the Yoruba people in Nigeria ex-
panded under British reorganization after the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when Yoruba referred only to the people of the Oyo kingdom. 
Elites use identification with ethnic and regional communities, and 
even accentuate them, to transfer potential hostility toward themselves, 
because of inequalities and power disparities within their communities, 
to the elites and subjects of other communities. Alexander, McGregor, 
and Ranger (2000, pp. 305–306) argue that “the salience of ethnic an-
tagonism in some recent wars cannot be explained as the inevitable 
resurgence of ancient tensions—rather, [such tensions] are the product 
of a reworking of historical memories in particular political contexts 
. . . Ethnicity is widely understood to be unnatural, to be historically 
‘invented,’ ‘constructed,’ or ‘imagined,’ and used ‘instrumentally’ by 
politicians.” In many instances, ethnic antagonism emerges during con-
flict rather than having been the cause of conflict. 
In 1980s South Africa, ethnic consciousness and cleavages were 
deliberately aroused as part of the government’s strategy of divide and 
rule implemented through the security apparatus. Chief Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party used cultural sym-
bolism to strengthen his and his party’s political power. During the most 
violent phase of conflict, 1991–1993, ethnic identities became further 
strengthened and reified, and their relevance as sources of political mo-
bilization increased (Auvinen and Kivimäki 1998, p. 42; 2001; Taylor 
and Shaw 1994). In a similar way, former Yugoslav President Slobodan 
Milosevic redeemed Serb nationalism by evoking the account of the 
Kosovo Polje battle of 1389–still painful to Serbian pride 600 years 
later. In Somalia, President Siad Barre succeeded in holding power for 
13 years after his failed military campaign in the Ogaden in 1977–78 
by manipulating clan identities and thus dividing the opposition into 
several different movements. This strategy, however, led to his ousting 
in 1991. By having fueled clan antagonisms, Barre made the instrumen-
tal use of clan affinities much easier for his opponents, who turned his 
work to their advantage (Auvinen and Kivimäki 2000, pp. 187–230).
According to Collier (2000b, pp. 12–13): “Ethnic grievance is ac-
tively manufactured by the rebel organization as a necessary way of 
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motivating its forces. As a result, where conflicts occur in ethnically di-
verse societies, they will look and sound as though they were caused by 
ethnic hatreds . . . Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively 
needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after 
the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict 
have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting orga-
nizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being 
caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-
group hatred and may even, as in Somalia, have created the groups.”16
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the way various factors within the political 
economy lead to humanitarian emergencies, characterized by war, state 
violence, and refugee displacement. A major factor responsible for the 
increase in emergencies in the 1990s was the developing world’s stag-
nation and protracted decline in incomes during the 1980s, which con-
tributed to state decay and collapse. Economic decline and predatory 
rule that fail to provide state services lead to relative deprivation, or 
to a perception by influential social groups of injustice arising from a 
growing discrepancy between conditions they expect and those they 
can get. Relative deprivation spurs social dissatisfaction and political 
violence. Poor economic performance undermines the legitimacy of a 
regime, increasing the probability of regime turnover. Political elites 
use repression to forestall threats to the regime and capture a greater 
share of the population’s declining surplus. Repression and economic 
discrimination trigger further discontent and sociopolitical mobilization 
on the part of the groups affected, worsening the humanitarian crisis. 
Protracted economic stagnation increases the probability of population 
displacement, hunger, and disease. 
Slow or negative per-capita growth, which is often accompanied by 
a chronic external disequilibrium, necessitates stabilization and adjust-
ment; those countries whose adjustment policies fail, so that they do not 
qualify for the IMF “Good Housekeeping seal,” are more vulnerable to 
humanitarian disaster. 
Another factor, high inequality in income, contributes to regional, 
ethnic, and class discrepancies that engender crises. In addition, the 
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competition for mineral resources by warlords and traders in weak 
states increases vulnerability to war and state violence. Authoritarian-
ism is related to emergencies but not in a linear fashion; instead, emer-
gencies first increase with authoritarian repression, then decrease along 
an inverted U-curve. Another explanation for emergencies is military 
centrality, found more frequently in decaying states. Military centrality 
can spur conflicts as well as increase poverty. Furthermore, a tradition 
of violent conflict, in which violence becomes normatively justifiable 
in a society, increases the risk of a humanitarian emergency. Contrary 
to a commonly held view, ethnicity is not usually a source of conflict 
and state violence but often emerges during conflict, sometimes as an 
invention or construction of politicians. 
Since low average income, slow economic growth, high income 
inequality, and a decaying state are important contributors to emergen-
cies, Third World states, with the support of the international commu-
nity, must strengthen and restructure the political economy of their own 
poor, inegalitarian, and weak states. The major changes governments 
of less developed countries need to make are economic and political 
institutional changes—the development of a legal system, enhanced 
financial institutions, increased taxing capacity, greater investment in 
basic education and other forms of social capital, well-functioning re-
source and exchange markets, programs to help weaker segments of 
the population, and democratic institutions that accommodate and co-
opt the country’s various ethnic and regional communities. Institutional 
and infrastructural development increases the productivity of private 
investment and public spending and enhances the effectiveness of gov-
ernance.
Industrialized countries and international agencies bear a substantial 
responsibility to help developing nations by modifying the international 
economic order to enhance those nations’ economic growth and adjust-
ment. Developing regions, for their part, must demand greater consider-
ation of their economic interests within present international economic 
and political institutions. The interests of the Third World can generally 
be served by the following means: the enhancing of its flexibility and 
self-determination in designing paths toward adjustment and liberaliza-
tion; a shift in the goals and openness of the IMF and World Bank; the 
restructuring of the international economic system for trade and capital 
flows; the opening of rich countries’ markets; more technological trans-
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fer by foreign companies, bilateral donors, and international agencies; a 
greater coherence of aid programs; and increased international funding 
to reduce food crises, directly help the poor, ameliorate external shocks, 
and write down debt burdens.
A number of countries vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies are 
not amenable to political economy solutions. Policies of governing elites 
are indeed at the root of most emergencies, and usually some powerful 
faction of society benefits from them. Yet a large number of countries 
vulnerable to emergencies have the will to change. Thus there is a sub-
stantial scope for international, national, and nongovernmental econom-
ic and political actors to coordinate their long-term policies to reduce the 
developing world’s vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.17 
Notes
 1. A weakening or decaying state is one experiencing a decline in the basic func-
tions of the state, such as possessing authority and legitimacy, making laws, 
preserving order, and providing basic social services. A complete breakdown in 
these functions indicates a failing or collapsing state (Holsti 2000, pp. 246–50; 
Zartman 1995, pp. 1–7). 
 2. Regression models include ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least 
squares (GLS or Prais-Winsten), two-stage least squares, fixed and random ef-
fects, tobit, and probit models. See Tables 3A.1–3A.4 for the results of a few of 
these regressions. 
 3. Queen Elizabeth House is the University of Oxford’s center for development 
studies.
 4.  This study is more applicable to preventing terrorism by the state or by warlords, 
the most frequent contributor to deaths from humanitarian emergencies, than to 
preventing terrorism by those trying to undermine the state. Falk (2002, p. 11) in-
dicates that the word terrorism initially “describe[d] political violence derive[d] 
from the government excesses that spun out of control during the French Revolu-
tion.” He deplores “the regressive narrowing of the concept of terrorism to apply 
only to violence by nonstate movements and organizations, thereby exempting 
state violence against civilians from the prohibition on terrorism . . . Such a usage 
is ethically unacceptable, politically manipulative and decidedly unhistorical.”
 5. Nafziger and Auvinen (2003, p. 201) found, like Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 
2000), that the incidence of armed conflict in Africa exceeded the incidence in 
other developing regions in the 1990s. If Africa’s economic performance had 
been as high as that of non-African LDCs, Africa’s incidence of conflict would 
have been similar to that of other developing regions (ibid.). Collier and Hoef-
fler’s finding is similar to ours. Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2001) indicate that 
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Africa had by far the greatest number of deaths (direct and indirect) from conflict 
during 1960–1995 as a proportion of the 1995 population—1.5 percent, com-
pared to 0.5 percent in the Middle East, 0.3 percent in Asia, and 0.1 percent in 
Latin America.
 6. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, p. 278) found that there was an inverse relation-
ship between IMF credits, as a percentage of GNP, and emergencies. Some of 
the explanation may stem from the IMF’s refraining from funding “basket cases” 
devastated by war and displacement. In that case, the negative coefficient would 
be picking up a reverse causal relationship. Indeed, our two-stage least squares 
results, using the IMF credits/GNP variable, confirmed this reverse causality. 
Moreover, when the IMF variable was used as a predictor for lagged values of 
dependent variables, its coefficients were larger than for the OLS regression, 
indicating that perhaps emergencies keep away the IMF rather than vice versa 
(Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, pp. 280–281). Thus, a potential emergency reduces 
the likelihood of receiving IMF and other international support for adjustment 
programs.
   A major contributor to nonadjustment is the distortion from an overvalued 
domestic currency. Nafziger (1988, pp. 150–160) argues that African govern-
ments resist adjustments to market prices and exchange rates that interfere with 
state leaders’ ability to build political support, especially in cities.
 7. Berdal and Malone (2000) ask whether greed or grievance drives contemporary 
civil wars. Our answer is that both greed and grievance (from deprivation and in-
equality) are consistent with most of their contributors. This view is at odds with 
that of the World Bank’s Collier, who holds that “the only result that supports the 
grievance approach to conflict is that a prior period of rapid economic decline 
increases the risk of conflict” (2000a, p. 97). But Collier, who apparently did not 
use Deininger and Squire’s dataset, finds that inequality “has no effect on the risk 
of conflict according to the data . . . The grievance theory of conflict thus finds 
surprisingly little empirical support” (Collier 2000a, pp. 97–98). Can we really 
argue that the East Timorans, the Kashmir mujahidin, Chechnyans, Palestinians, 
the Hutu, Nuba, and southern Sudanese, to name just a few, are motivated only 
by greed and not also by grievance?
 8. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1994) 
indicates that 3,750 people were killed in internal repression and resistance in 
South Africa in 1993. Moreover, Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1996, 1997, 1998) 
classify South Africa from 1991 to 1993 as a war. 
 9.  This thesis was introduced by Buss (1961, p. 58) and was developed in Gurr’s rela-
tive deprivation model (1970), where “utilitarian and normative justifications”—
views on the utility and appropriateness of collective violence—affected the likeli-
hood of political violence. Utilitarian and normative justifications were secondary 
to relative deprivation, which was a necessary condition for political violence. A 
squared term has been used to capture the curvilinearity of the relationship (see, 
e.g., Boswell and Dixon (1990). 
 10.  Whereas in resource mobilization/rational actor theories the inverted U-curve re-
lationship relates to the opportunities for resource mobilization and to the calcula-
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tion of costs and benefits by rational individuals, in frustration-aggression/relative 
deprivation theories it is viewed as being analogous to the concept of punishment 
in psychological theories (see Markus and Nesvold 1972, p. 235). 
 11.  On difficulties related to Cutright’s index, see Bollen (1980).
 12.  The sample consisted of 83 developing and developed countries in 1958–1960; 
African countries are not included in the analyses.
 13.  “Their [the dictatorships’] legitimacy often rests largely on their purported abil-
ity to provide economic efficiency and social order. Depression and debt disaster 
severely undermine those capabilities . . . More significant . . . may be the advan-
tages of democracies. One virtue is that they have other sources of legitimacy. 
They can claim to be elected, representative, popular, and fair. They can convey a 
more equitable image of the distribution of sacrifices. In the absence of ‘economic 
goods,’ democracies can distribute ‘political goods,’ such as freedom of speech and 
assembly, which also provide safety valves for discontent” (Drake 1989, 53–54).
 14.  For more detail on how authoritarianism and democracy have affected emergen-
cies, especially in the 1990s, see Nafziger and Auvinen 2003, pp. 114–131.
15. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, pp. 278–279, 286) find a direct association be-
tween the number of deaths from intrastate violence in the 1960s and 1970s and 
humanitarian emergencies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
16. This view marks a departure from Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 567), in which 
one variable explaining civil war and its duration is the extent of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. 
17.  Nafziger and Väyrynen (2002) provide detail on policies to prevent humanitarian 
emergencies.
Appendix 3A
Results of Regression Analyses
Table 3A.1  Humanitarian Emergencies: OLS Regression Models
Explanatory 
variables LDEATREF LHUMEMER LCOHE
Constant 7.31*** (2.67) 4.27** (1.85) 15.07*** (2.51)
LGDPGRO[−1] −1.83*** (0.55) −1.16*** (0.38) −2.54*** (0.52)
LGINI[−1] 0.29** (0.12) 0.18** (0.08) 0.36*** (0.11)
LGNPCAP[−1] −0.15*** (0.03) −0.07*** (0.02) −0.19*** (0.03)
LIMFGNP[−1] −0.10*** (0.03) −0.05*** (0.02) −0.06** (0.03)
LCPIDIFF[−1] 0.26*** (0.06) 0.20*** (0.04) 0.27*** (0.05)
LMILCENT[−1] 0.18*** (0.03) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD 0.04*** (0.01) a 0.02* (0.01)
R square 0.18 0.16 0.19
N 663 663 663
DW 0.34 0.31 0.38
NOTE: The figures are parameter estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors. OLS 
stands for ordinary least squares. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln 
Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/
GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln mili-
tary expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77. 
Except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coeffi-
cient significance: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 
0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test); a = not 
significant. DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation.
SOURCE: Nafziger and Auvinen (2003), p. 23.
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Table 3A.2  Humanitarian Emergencies: GLS (Prais-Winsten) 
 Regression Models
Explanatory 
variables LDEATREF LHUMEMER LCOHE
Constant −2.69*** (0.81) 1.18a(0.73) 2.82*** (0.58)
LGDPGRO[−1] b −0.29**(0.14) a
LFOODGRO [−1] −0.19* (0.12) a b
LGINI[−1] 0.97*** (0.16) 0.14* (0.08) 0.56*** (0.14)
LGNPCAP[−1] −0.14*** (0.04) −0.07*** (0.02) −0.21*** (0.03)
LIMFGNP[−1] a a a
LCPIDIFF[−1] 0.16*** (0.04) a 0.19*** (0.04)
LMILCENT[−1] 0.19*** (0.04) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.19*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD 0.05*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.007) 0.03*** (0.01)
Rho 0.86***(0.02) 0.88***(0.02) 0.83***(0.02)
N 600 753 732
DW 1.93 1.64 1.98
NOTE: The figures are parameter estimates and in parentheses, standard errors. GLS 
stands for generalized least squares.  LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LFOODGRO 
= ln growth of food production per capita; LGINI = ln Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln 
GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer 
price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEAT-
RAD = ln deaths from domestic violence, 1963–77. Except for LDEATRAD, all ex-
planatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Rho = coefficient of autocorrelation. 
Coefficient significance: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant 
at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test); a 
= not significant; b = not included in the equation. DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic 
for serial correlation.




ent, Inequality, and W
ar   57
Table 3A.3  Humanitarian Emergencies: Fixed (LSDV) and Random Effects (GLS) Models
LDEATREF LHUMEMER LCOHE
Explanatory 
variables Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Constant 3.52*** (0.85) 3.68** (1.46) 0.69** (0.32) 0.11a (0.27) 11.10*** (1.56) 8.61*** (1.19)
LGDPGRO[−1] a −0.45* (0.27) a a −0.72*** (0.26) −0.53** (0.25)
LGINI[−1] −0.90*** (0.23) −0.44** (0.19) a a −0.50** (0.23) a
LGNPCAP[−1] a a −0.11** (0.05) −0.07** (0.03) −0.19*** (0.05) −0.22*** (0.04)
LCPIDIFF[−1] a a a 0.07** (0.03) a a
LMILCENT[−1] 0.23*** (0.03) 0.20*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.24*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD a 0.05** (0.02) a a a a
No. of units 69 62 91 77 61 83
R square 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.18
N 885 775 1,102 933 752 996
NOTE: The figures are parameter estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors. LSDV stands for least square dummy variable. GLS 
stands for generalized least squares. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; 
LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from do-
mestic violence, 1963–77. Except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coefficient significance: * signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test); 
a = not significant. R square is for “within effects” in the fixed effects model and for “overall effects” in the random effects model. Num-
ber of units = number of cross-sectional units taken into account by the analysis.
SOURCE: Nafziger and Auvinen (2003), p. 25.
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Table 3A.4  Probabilities of Humanitarian Emergencies: Probit Models
Explanatory variables LDEATREF LHUMEMER
LGDPGRO[−1] −0.82* (0.45) −0.41** (0.20)
LGINI[−1] 0.25*** (0.10) 0.12** (0.05)
LGNPCAP[−1] −0.13*** (0.03) −0.03** (0.01)
LIMFGNP[−1] −0.07*** (0.03) −0.014 (0.011)
LCPIDIFF[−1]  0.05 (0.04) −0.01 (0.02)
LMILCENT[−1] 0.05* (0.028) 0.02* (0.01)
LDEATRAD 0.04*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.003)
Obs. P 0.33 0.08
Pred. P 0.30 0.05
Log likelihood −309.79 −136.60
Chi squared 95.40 35.42
N 562 562
NOTE: The figures are changes in probabilities and, in parentheses, standard errors.
LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP 
per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price 
index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = 
ln deaths from domestic violence, 1963–77. Except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory 
variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coefficient significance: * significant at the 0.10 
level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant 
at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Obs. P = observed probability; Pred. P = predicted 
probability at the mean of the dependent variable. The statistical significance of the 
model is tested against the value of Chi squared with 7 degrees of freedom.
SOURCE: Nafziger and Auvinen (2003), p. 26.
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